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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a framework for estimating market share and price reaction equations in an attempt to
understand the nature of competitive interaction in the market for private label and branded grocery products.  Specifically,
we employ a Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a), and specify the
price reaction equations derived under the LA/AIDS demand specification. This enables us to consistently estimate share-
price relationships, accounting for demand-side and competitive reactions simultaneously.  The incorporation of LA/AIDS
demands into a structural equation framework represents an important departure from previous demand specifications in
competitive analysis. In addition to its rigorous foundation in utility theory, LA/AIDS demands are especially flexible for
demand-side estimation, provide consistent reaction functions on the supply side, and have particularly nice aggregation
properties.
In order to test the relative contribution of employing a flexible LA/AIDS functional form on the demand-side, and in a
preliminary attempt to assess manufacturer-retailer interaction on the supply side, we compare our general framework
(LA/AIDS demands with retailers following a proportional markup rule) to two alternative models of manufacturer-retailer
interaction:  Choi’s (1991) Manufacturer-Stackelberg (M-S) model under linear demands, as well as Shubik demands under
Stackelberg conduct (Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995a, 1995b).
We first apply the proposed LA/AIDS framework to a sample pooled across 125 categories and 54 geographic markets in
an attempt to produce result that generalize across the entire sample. We then estimate all three models using data on seven
individual categories:  bread, milk, pasta, yogurt, instant coffee, butter and margarine. We conclude that the LA/AIDS
demand specification is preferred to the alternative linear demand specifications. Further, the empirical findings support our
premise that consumer response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and the factors influencing firm pricing behavior
(supply) jointly determine observed market prices and market shares. Most importantly, our specification with LA/AIDS
demands produced excellent overall fits, as well as reasonable demand and price response elasticities.
Keywords: Competition; Competitive Strategy; Private Labels; PricingMarket Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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1. Introduction
The nature of competitive interaction between
“national brand” and “private label” products has been a
primary concern of marketing managers in the retail food
industry for some time now. Over the past decade,
understanding the different factors that influence the
competitive interaction between national brands and
private labels has taken on greater urgency.  In this vein, in
1996, private label sales in food stores increased 6.3%
versus manufacturer brand growth of just 1.3%, while
retailer-controlled brands have outpaced manufacturer
brands in 12 of the most recent 14 quarters (Progressive
Grocer, November 1996).  Overall, private label brands in
U.S. supermarkets reached an all-time high unit market
share of 20.8% in the third quarter of 1997, according to
IRI (BrandWeek, 11/24/97). Alternatively, private label
sales have declined in some categories as national brands
have effectively responded to private label competition
(BrandWeek, 5/29/95, New York Times 6/11/96). Yet,
despite the increasingly intense competitive interaction
between private labels and national brands, surprisingly
little research has been conducted addressing this issue.
Previous research in marketing has focused on the
variation in market share of private label products across
categories (Sethuraman 1992; Sethuraman and
Mittelstaedt 1992; Hoch and Banerji 1993; Narasimhan
and Wilcox 1998). A number of factors have been
identified in the literature to explain this variation.
Sethuraman (1992), for example, identifies twelve
marketplace factors as potential determinants of private
label success.  These factors include retail sales volume,
average retail price, price differential between the private
label and national brands, retail private label price
promotion and brand promotion.
While the focus in marketing has primarily been on
market share relationships, recent work in the economics
and industrial organization literature has focused on the
determinants of firm price setting behavior.  Conceptually,
the nature of manufacturer-retailer competition in any
market will affect both the within channel power and the
incentives for stocking and promoting store brands. The
price setting behavior of both manufacturers and retailers
will depend upon cost and demand considerations, as well
as the nature of strategic interaction between competitors,
including the potential use of market power by
manufacturers and/or retailers.  It is well established that
factors that increase market power (such as increased
concentration and market share) result in higher market
prices (Deneckere and Davidson 1985, and Weiss 1989).
More recently, a number of studies have addressed
competitive interaction in detail. One approach to
estimating this interaction requires specifying, a priori, the
various forms of competitive interaction to be considered
(hence it is often referred to as a “menu” approach). Non-
nested hypothesis tests are used to ascertain which type of
competition best fits the data (see, e.g., Gasmi, Laffont
and Vuong 1992, and Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta
1996). Alternatively, a conjectural variations approach has
been used to estimate the competitive interaction directly
without the need to specify the interactions a priori (see,
e.g., Putsis and Dhar 1997, and Kadiyali, Vilcassim and
Chintagunta 1998). Other studies, such as those by
Connor and Peterson (1992) and Slade (1995), have
empirically addressed competition between private labels
and national brands, but have not focused on the
simultaneous determination of price and share.
1
While previous work addressing the nature of
competitive interaction has produced sophisticated models
on the supply side, previous demand specifications used in
much of the research on private label-national brand
interaction have been rather restrictive in functional form.
For example, models developed by Choi (1991) and by
Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1995a, 1995b) employ
restricted versions of a linear demand model.
2  While the
restricted version of the Shubik model (Shubik and Levitan
1980) used by Raju, et al. is derived from an underlying
consumer utility model, the model proposed by Choi is not.
Neither demand structure allows for the imposition and
testing of the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions from
demand theory.  Further, both impose Bertrand price
competition (i.e., zero price conjectures) between
manufacturers and Stackelberg behavior between
manufacturers and retailers. Thus, while each of these
models are important for the derivation of clean analytic
results, estimation is not often easy and counter-intuitive
restrictions on the demand-side parameters may need to be
imposed. Further, recent theoretical work has suggested
that that nature of vertical relationship depends upon the
convexity of the demand structure (Lee and Staelin 1997).
Building on this research, we maintain that developing
                                               
1.  Alternatively, other studies such as Kadiyali, Vilcassim and
Chintagunta (1998) estimate demand and supply-side equations
simultaneously, but do not address private label-national brand
interaction, a focus of our study.
2.  We note that Choi (1991) addresses nonlinear demand
specification through numerical analysis.  He does this since it is
“extremely difficult to obtain analytical results” for a nonlinear
specification (p. 279).Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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a complete understanding of the nature of the competitive
interaction between national brands and private labels
requires an understanding of the determinants of both
demand and strategic pricing decisions by firms.  As an
example, recent price cuts in the ready-to-eat cereal
category by Post and Nabisco in response to pressure from
private label resulted in a consumer response that
increased its market share from about 16 percent to over
20 percent, while decreasing private label shares.  In
response, Kellogg’s announced a 20 percent across the
board price cut due to declining shares of its major brands
(New York Times, 6/11/96). General Mills and Quaker
Oats also reduced prices. Clearly share responds to price,
while the price setting behavior of firms depends upon the
game being played by interdependent agents. Examining
partial demand elasticity, i.e. the change in quantity due to
a change in price assuming all other prices remain
constant, gives at best an incomplete picture of the
interaction between brands and private labels. Consumer
response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and
the factors influencing the pricing behavior of firms jointly
determine observed market prices and quantities (market
shares).
3
In this paper, we expand on previous work by deriving
a structural system of equations that allows for the
simultaneous estimation of competitive interaction and
demand parameters under a more flexible demand
specification, the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal
Demand System (LA/AIDS). The use of a flexible demand
system empirically is consistent with the theoretical
dependence of vertical relationships on demand convexity
suggested by Lee and Staelin (1997). In order to assess the
relative contribution of the proposed framework versus
existing models, we derive and estimate a general linear
system that nests two well-cited competing models of
retailer-manufacturer interaction: a) the Choi (1991)
Manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) model, and b) the Raju,
Sethuraman and Dhar (1995a)’s model of Stackelberg
conduct with Shubik demands.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we
describe the theoretical model that guides the empirical
specification and the selection of variables. Using
                                               
3.  It is well known that OLS applied equation by equation to
jointly endogenous variables (e.g., price as a function of share
and share a function of price as explained above) will produce
inconsistent parameter estimates (see, e.g., Intriligator 1978 or
Judge, 1985).  Simultaneous equation approaches to estimation
have a long history in marketing (Bass 1969; Schultz 1971;
Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 1990; Neslin 1990).
LA/AIDS demands, we are able to derive price reaction
equations consistent with the LA/AIDS demand
specification. We then derive the specific reaction
equations for the models set forth by Choi (1991) and
Raju, et al. (1995a). In the Empirical Analysis section that
follows, we describe the methodology used in the empirical
analysis in some detail.  In the Results section, we first
present estimates of model parameters for the LA/AIDS
framework applied to a large cross-category panel data set
that includes 125 categories in 54 local markets.  We
compare these results to those obtained by applying the
proposed LA/AIDS framework to the data for seven
individual categories: milk, butter, bread, yogurt, pasta,
margarine and instant coffee. These results are then
compared to those obtained for the Choi (1991) and Raju,
et al. (1995a, 1995b) models. The paper concludes with a
more detailed discussion of the LA/AIDS parameter
estimates, relevant managerial implications and
suggestions for future research.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 General Framework
Following work by Choi (1991) and Besanko, Gupta
and Jain (1997), we begin with a category-level model of
manufacturers operating in a duopoly, with one producing
a national “branded” product and the other producing a
“private label” product.  Both products compete in a
specific geographic area with price the sole strategic
variable. The manufacturers sell to a local retailer by
specifying a wholesale price, with the retailer setting the
retail price.  Following the rationale set forth by Besanko,
Gupta and Jain (1997), we begin by assuming each retailer
acts as a “local monopolist.”
4
We begin with a general framework and then discuss
                                               
4.  Besanko, Gupta and Jain (1997), p. 6, provide a strong
rationale for this assumption, which is also made by Choi
(1991). They cite the work of Slade (1995), who interviewed
grocery chain managers “who reported that the vast majority of
households (over 90%) do not engage in comparison shopping
by visiting several stores” to seek out the best deal.  This
suggests that “competition takes place across brands within a
store rather than across stores in a local market …” (italics
added).  Slade (1995), using data from the Saltine category,
empirically demonstrates that sales within one chain are
unaffected by prices at other chains, suggesting pricing
independence across rival chains within a category.  This is also
consistent with the work of Walters and Mackenzie (1988), who
use data across all grocery items sold by two retailers. We are
able to relax this assumption in the empirical analysis below.Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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potential functional form specifications, focusing on the
estimation of demands and price reactions under LA/AIDS
demands. We begin by defining the following set of
variables:
ij
1 P  = the retail price per unit volume of the national brand
in category i and city j.
ij
2 P  = the retail price per unit volume of the private label
brand in category i and city j.
ij
1 Q  = the quantity of the national brand sold in category i
and city j.
ij
2 Q  = the quantity of the private label sold in category i
and city j.
Dij = demand shift variables for category i and city j.
C
1
ij = supply-side cost shift variables for the national
brand in category i and city j.
C
2
ij = supply-side cost shift variables for the private label
in category i and city j.
Define the general retail demand functions for national
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The quantity of the national and private label products
demanded are specified to be a function of prices and,
following Hoch, Kim, Montgomery and Rossi (1995), a set
of demand shift variables that will include per capita
expenditures in category i and city j, the level of retail
promotion in category i and city j, family income level in
city j (reflecting the overall affluence of the geographic
area), and median age in city j.  Define the cost functions













Thus, the total cost of producing Q
1
ij is a function of
production, Q
1
ij, and a vector of supply side cost shift
variables, C
1
ij. In a game where price is the strategic





ij, respectively) and the profit maximizing
problems for the two manufacturers are:




























Based upon the two wholesale prices, the retailer
decides on the retail prices for both products that
maximize its profits:




















These maximization problems give rise to four first
order conditions.  When combined with the two retail


















ij were available, it would be possible to
estimate the six structural equations above.  However,
since available scanner data does not generally provide
information on wholesale prices, we can only reduce the
structural equation estimation problem to four equations









ij) by imposing additional structure on the system.
Following Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), we will begin
by assuming vertical Stackelberg conduct within the
channel (with the manufacturer as the leader).
5 Since in a
Stackelberg game, the manufacturer knows the retailer’s











when the manufacturer sets w1 , the retail price P1 is
chosen as well.  Thus, one can invert the response
functions for wholesale prices as a function of retail prices,
substitute these in the manufacturers profit maximization
equations (5 and 6) and maximize the manufacturer’s
profits with respect to its retail price.  This gives two first
order equations that can be solved for two reaction
functions and two demand equations which are functions









The general form of the derived reaction functions is as
follows:
P R P D C ij ij ij ij
1
1
2 1 = ( , , ), (8)
P R P D C ij ij ij ij
2
2
1 2 = ( , , ) . (9)
Equations (8) and (9) represent the retail price reaction
equations to be estimated.  These equations, to be
estimated simultaneously with the demand equations (1)
                                               
5 . In the LA/AIDS specification that follows, we also assume
that retailers follow a proportionate markup rule.  We derive
tests for Stackelberg profit maximizing and proportional markup
behavior and empirically test for these vertical pricing strategies
in our analysis below. These results enable us to assess the
appropriateness of the assumptions inherent in the proposed
LA/AIDS framework.Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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In moving from the general functional form
specification of equations (10), (12) and (13) to the exact
empirical specification, the LA/AIDS demands in (10) and
the derived reaction functions in (12) and (13) dictate the
choice and functional form of most of the variables to be
included in the empirical specification. However, as with
any empirical analysis, there are some important additional
issues that need to be addressed in moving from the theory
to the exact empirical specification.  For example, note
that the brand level Herfindahl index used in the  empirical
analysis is defined as the sum of the square of all
individual brand market shares.
18  As such, when
introduced jointly with national brand market share, it
measures the size dispersion of brands. Thus, we use the
brand Herfindahl as an imperfect, but readily available,
instrument for segmentation and multiple brand strategies.
To see this, note that branded share may sum to .80 (80
percent) with only two brands each with .40 share.  In this
case, the brand level Herfindahl index equals .32.
However, if there are 80 brands each with .01 market share
(much like the breakfast cereal category), then the brand
Herfindahl is only .008.  To the extent that the brand level
Herfindahl index measures the degree of product
differentiation via brand proliferation, we hypothesize that
it will be negatively related to the prices of branded
products. Segmentation and multiple brand strategies in a
category tend to elevate the prices of all national brands
(Willig 1991; Levy and Reitzes, 1993; Werden and
Rozanski 1994, Putsis 1997).
19
                                                                                 
variables:  total branded share, total private label share, volume-
weighted average price of national brands, and the volume-
weighted average price of private label products. Also, note that
the choice of variables was influenced by data availability.  For
example, no coupon or national advertising information was
available, while average age, income and percent Hispanic were
the only local demographic variables available.
18. Note that we use the brand Herfindahl, not the company
Herfindahl (which are not available). The brand level Herfindahl
in breakfast cereal, for example, is very low but the company
level Herfindahl is very high because each of the top three
companies sells many brands.
19.  In many empirical settings, it is important to specify the
Herfindahl index as endogenous - since the Herfindahl is a
function of market share by definition, if share is endogenous, so
must be the Herfindahl. Here, however, the situation is
somewhat different.  In our analysis, the primary cause of
variation in the brand Herfindahl is individual brand share
dispersion, which is not a function of aggregate national brand
share (which is used in the empirical analysis).  Given that the
brand Herfindahl measures the share dispersion of the individual
brands, we use it here as an imperfect but readily available
The relationship between the brand level Herfindahl
and price is likely to be different for private label products,
however.  One might expect that elevated national brand
prices in markets with low brand Herfindahls would also
allow private labels to increase price.  However,
Schmalensee’s (1978) analysis of brand proliferation as a
barrier to entry suggests that the impact of the brand
Herfindahl upon private label prices may be positive.  As
leading firms in these markets build portfolios of brands
with small shares, it is harder for private labels to enter
with a me-too brand.  For example, many successful
children’s cereal brands capture only .006 (.6%) of the
cereal market.  A private label brand can hope at best to
capture one third of this. The resulting volume is not
sufficient to sustain production and distribution. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that private label price is
positively related to the brand level Herfindahl index.
We also include a series of endogenous trade promotion
variables in the price reaction equation.
20  These promotion
variables consist of temporary percent price reduction,
percent of volume sold on display, and percent of volume
sold with a local newspaper feature ad.  For example,
percent price reduction for national brands (private label)
are specified in the branded (private label) price reaction
equation because reported prices are net of such
reductions. The display and feature variables are specified
as demand shift variables. As such, they appear in the
demand equation, as well as the price reaction equations.
This specification corresponds with the standard
conceptualization of end-aisle displays and feature ads
increasing sales even if there is no price promotion.
Finally, since prior empirical work on the concentration-
price relationship in grocery retailing suggests that the
general level of the markup in a local market is related to
retailer concentration (Marion 1979, Weiss 1989), we also
specify the retail grocery four firm concentration ratio in
                                                                                 
instrument for segmentation and multiple brand strategies.
Dropping the variable from the model had no appreciable effect
on the estimation results for other variables in the model.
20. We address the endogeneity of the trade promotion variables
through the use of instrumental variables. The principle is
similar to the approach taken by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995).  Specifically, each promotional vehicle for market i,
category j, is expressed as a function of the promotional activity
in each of the other j (j „ i) markets, using the fitted value as the
instrument. Note that in order for this approach to eliminate the
endogeneity bias, the equation errors for each promotion
instrument have to be independent. This requires that display
and feature decisions, for example, are made on a market by
market (or chain by chain) basis.Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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the price reaction curves to control for possible deviations
from our monopoly retailer assumption (Besanko, Gupta
and Jain 1997). Equation (21) presents the final form of
the proposed LA/AIDS specification. Appendix B
summarizes our key hypotheses.
BRSHARE =  a10 + a11 BRPRICE + a12 PLPRICE + a13
EXPENDITURE + a14 BRFEATURE + a15
BRDISPLAY +  a16 PLDISTN +  a17 PLFEATURE +
a18 PLDISPLAY + a19 INCOME + a110 HISPANIC +
a111 FAMAGE + e1
PLSHARE  = a20 + a21 BRPRICE + a22 PLPRICE + a23
EXPENDITURE + a24 BRFEATURE + a25
BRDISPLAY + a26 PLDISTN + a27 PLFEATURE +
a28 PLDISPLAY + a29 INCOME + a210 HISPANIC +
a211 FAMAGE + e2
(21)
BRPRICE   = b10 + b11 PLPRICE + b12 BRPRICEREDN
+ b13 BRVOLPUN +  b14 HERFINDAHL +  b15
GROCCR4 + b16 EXPENDITURE + b17
BRFEATURE + b18 BRDISPLAY + b19
PLFEATURE + b110 PLDISPLAY + b111 PLDISTN +
b112 INCOME + b113 HISPANIC + b114 FAMAGE +
w1
PLPRICE   = b20 + b21 BRPRICE + b22 PLPRICEREDN +
b23 PLVOLPUN +  b24 HERFINDAHL +  b25
GROCCR4 + b26 EXPENDITURE + b27
BRFEATURE +  b28 BRDISPLAY +  b29 PLFEATUE
+ b210 PLDISPLAY + b211 PLDISTN +  b212 INCOME
+  b213 HISPANIC + b214 FAMAGE + w2.
4. Empirical Estimation
4.1 Data
The data used in this study are IRI market-level data
on food products across 59 geographic markets and 211
categories for 1991 and 1992.  Categories were excluded
from the analysis if they contained missing data, or if they
were categories where private labels have not been
introduced.  This left 125 categories in the sample and
6,717 observations for an average coverage of 54 cities in
a typical category.  National brand volume (dollar) share
averaged .721 (.775) in 1992.
These data were merged with independent data from
Progressive Grocer on the demographic characteristics of
the IRI geographic markets.  Thus, we have two principal
dimensions on which the data vary—across categories and
across geographic markets. Consistent with previous work
in the private label area (e.g., Sethuraman and Mittelstaedt
1992; Hoch and Banerji 1993; Slade 1995), aggregate
branded and private label variables were created for the
125 product categories and 54 markets.  Brand price,
feature, display, and price reduction variables are volume
as opposed to dollar market share weighted averages.
4.2 Methodology – LA/AIDS
The LA/AIDS system (equations 10, 12 and 13) was
estimated directly using three stage least squares.  Note
that although our model has four equations, one of the
demand equations is redundant for estimation purposes.
Since the market shares of national brands and private
labels sum to one, any loss of branded share due to
changes in any variable, e.g. private label price, must go to
private label share.  This general adding up property of a
demand system means that we can recover the estimated
coefficients and standard errors (t-ratios) for the dropped
equation.  We drop the private label demand equation and
estimate the remaining 3 equations with three stage least
squares.
In an attempt to obtain results that generalize across
all categories in the data set, we began by estimating the
LA/AIDS system using a sample pooled across the 125
categories. It is important to note that cross-category
analysis of this type precludes the use of price levels: one
cannot compare the price of a pound of cheese to the price
of canned soup. Thus, it would be inappropriate to conduct
a cross-category analysis focusing on price relationships
using data across multiple categories for a given time
period (see, e.g., Kelton and Weiss 1989). Consequently,
following Kelton and Weiss (1989), we estimated a first
difference form on the pooled data.
21  Note that when
conducting a cross-category study, estimating a first
difference model is particularly attractive because it
controls for first order fixed effects due to excluded local
market and category variables in level regressions.
22 
                                               
21. 
 For example, in the first difference equations, BRSHARE is
1992 BRSHARE minus 1991 BRSHARE and BRPRICE is the
1992 LN(BRPRICE) minus the 1991 LN(BRPRICE). Changes
in the natural logarithm of price from 1991 to 1992 are percent
price changes that can be analyzed across categories.
22.  Hausman and Taylor (1981) argue that excluded local
market variables in panel data of this type can bias estimation
results for level regressions.  They show that this can be avoided
by specifying a set of city binary variables.  These drop out of the
model when one takes the first difference.  This is also true forMarket Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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Further, to the extent that private label quality is constant
from 1991 to 1992, estimating a first difference model
eliminates the need for the inclusion of a private label
quality measure for each category - an assumed constant
level of quality drops out of the analysis when we
difference.  This is particularly important since quality
measurement is such a difficult task (Hoch and Banerji
1993 and Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998).
In addition, in order to investigate differences that
might exist across categories, we also estimated the
proposed LA/AIDS framework using data for seven
individual categories: milk, butter, bread, yogurt, pasta,
margarine, and instant coffee. Since individual category-
level analysis does not suffer from the same apples-to-
oranges comparison that cross-category analysis does, we
used the “level” data for each period for each individual
category (we will refer to the data stacked from 1991 to
1992 data as the “level” data, and the data for 1992 minus
1991 as the “first difference” data). To summarize, the
LA/AIDS specification was estimated using a first
difference form applied to the sample pooled across all
125 categories, as well for seven individual categories
using the level data.
4.3 Model Performance and Comparison with
Alternative Functional Forms
In addition to the LA/AIDS specification, we
estimated the Choi Manufacturer-Stackelberg model
(equations 14 and 15) and the Raju, et al. model (equations
16 and 17) for each of the seven individual categories
using three stage least squares.  For each category, we
estimated both models using the level data and used nested
hypotheses tests to assess which of the two forms best fit
the observed behavior in that specific category (as per the
discussion above and Appendix A).  In each instance, to
facilitate comparisons, we used the same set of
independent variables that were used in the LA/AIDS
specification.
Thus, we make two sets of comparisons: i) individual-
level category results across the Choi (1991) Manufacturer
Stackelberg, Raju et al. (1995a) and the proposed
LA/AIDS framework, and ii) the impact of pooling across
categories on the parameter estimates (within the
LA/AIDS specification). In doing so, we have attempted to
assess the relative performance of the proposed LA/AIDS
framework (versus two alternative model formulations), as
well as the appropriate data to use when employing the
                                                                                 
specifying a set of category binary variables in level regressions
to control for excluded variables in individual categories.
LA/AIDS framework (individual category or pooled).
5. Results
We begin by discussing the results obtained by
estimating the LA/AIDS specification using the pooled
sample and the first difference data, and then conclude by
discussing the individual category results for all three
models using the level data. Results are reported in Tables
1 through 4 (t-statistics in parentheses).  Since traditional
R
2 measures are not bounded between zero and one in
three stage least squares, Carter and Nagar’s (1977)
multiple squared coefficient of correlation for
simultaneous systems, Rw
2, was used.
23  All systems fit
well, with the system-wide Rw
2 values ranging from a low
of 0.9435 for bread under LA/AIDS to a high of 0.9997
for instant coffee and margarine in the linear specification.
5.1 LA/AIDS Estimation – Pooled Results
Tables1 and 2 present the results using the sample
pooled across all 125 categories. Table 1 presents the full
set of parameter estimates, while Table 2 presents the
implied demand elasticities. The LA/AIDS specification
applied to the pooled data performs extremely well. All of
the coefficients have the hypothesized signs and are
statistically significant, with the exception of the variables
representing percent Hispanic and average family age (in
the demand system) and private label feature and display
(in the national brand price reaction equation).
In the price reaction equations, there is evidence of
strategic interaction, but it is not particularly strong, and is
only mildly asymmetric. For example, a 10 percent
increase in national brand price leads to a mere 1.15
percent increase in private label price. Similarly, a 10
percent increase in private label price only leads to a 1
percent increase in national brand price. Note also that the
four-firm retail concentration has a significant and positive
impact on both branded and private labels prices. The
coefficient is 50 percent higher for private label products
(.06 versus .04 for national brands), suggesting that the
price differential between private labels and national
brands narrows in more concentrated local grocery
markets.  This is consistent with prior work on the
relationship between concentration and price in grocery
                                               
23.  Rw
2 has a usual R
2 interpretation.  Specifically, it measures
the percent of system-wide variation in the exogenous variables
explained by all independent variables in the system.  It is
bounded by zero and one. However, we note that this statistic is
frequently very high and should be interpreted with caution (see
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retailing, but represents a significant advance due to the
number of categories and markets studied here. Previous
work relied on price indexes for only 96 products collected
by in-store price surveys across only a few supermarket
chains.  Marion (1979), for example, analyzed prices for 3
chains in 35 major urban markets.  Cotterill (1986)
analyzed price indices using the same product set, but only
for 2 chains in small towns in Vermont. In contrast, this
study encompasses thousands of products and virtually all
supermarkets in 54 major urban markets.
On the demand-side, the results in Table 2 suggest
that the estimated own price elasticities for national brands
(-1.078) and for private labels (-1.026) are highly
significant, but lower than own price elasticities estimated
at the category or product level. The cross-price elasticities
are positive as hypothesized, but only the private label
demand cross-price elasticity is statistically significant.
Consistent with previous work by Blattberg and
Wisniewski (1989) and Allenby and Rossi (1991),
national brand price affects private label demand, but
changes in the private label price do not significantly effect
national brands.
5.2 Individual Category Results and Model Selection
(LA/AIDS, Choi 1991, Raju, et al. 1995a)
Table 3 presents the estimated demand and price
reaction elasticities for the LA/AIDS specification using
the “level” data for seven categories, while Table 4a
presents the corresponding estimated demand and reaction
elasticities for the linear demand model. Table 4b presents
the results from the hypotheses tests used to determine a)
whether the Choi (1991) or Raju, et al. (1995a) demand
model best fit the data, and b) whether the results are
consistent with Stackelberg conduct and/or proportional
mark-up pricing (Appendix A).
Examining Table 4b first, hypothesis tests favor the
Choi (1991) model for the butter, bread, and margarine
categories, while the Raju, et al. (1995a) modified Shubik
demands are more consistent with the milk, yogurt, pasta,
and instant coffee categories. Out of 14 tests for
Stackelberg price reaction coefficients (7 for national
brands and 7 for private labels), all but four are consistent
with Stackelberg behavior within the channel. Out of 14
tests for proportional markup conduct, all but two (both
for private labels) are consistent with proportional markup
behavior within the channel.  Note that the inability to
reject Stackelberg and proportional mark-up behavior for
almost all within channel pricing behavior (and for
essentially all private label pricing) is consistent with the
assumption of Stackelberg proportional mark-up behavior
used in the derivation of the LA/AIDS reaction functions.
In comparing the LA/AIDS results in Table 3 to the
linear demand results in Table 4a, we can not use
traditional non-nested hypotheses tests to compare the
models—note that the dependent variable in the LA/AIDS
demand specification is expenditure share, while the
dependent variable in the Choi (1991) and Raju, et al.
(1995a) models is quantity. Since expenditure share
cannot be represented as an appropriate transformation of
quantity (see Balasubramanian and Jain 1994, pp. 56-57),
even non-nested tests that can sometimes be used to
compare models with different dependent variables (the
Vuong and P-E tests), are not appropriate here.
24  
Fortunately, more subjective measures of the relative
performance of the different demand specifications paint a
clear picture.
For the LA/AIDS parameter estimates in Table 3, the
empirical estimation produced results with not only a great
deal of face validity, but also results that were consistent
with previous research on a number of dimensions. For
example, Tellis (1988) in a meta-analysis of reported
demand elasticities, found the mean price elasticity of
demand to be -1.71, consistent with the national brand
elasticities reported in the first row of Table 3. In addition,
consistent with the pooled results, we find significant
asymmetric price response - estimated private label own
price elasticities are higher in most categories. However,
this asymmetry is reversed in the butter category, which is
consistent with recent work by Bronnenberg and Wathieu
(1996). In terms of the price reaction elasticities, the price
reactions of national brands were small in magnitude, with
the highest price reaction by national brands occurring in
the category with one of the highest private label shares
(margarine).  Overall, the reported price reactions are very
close to those reported by Lambin (1976) and others (see,
e.g., Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 1990, pp. 201-210).
Alternatively, the results for the Choi (1991) and Raju,
et al. (1995a) linear demand specifications show fewer
significant coefficients, and a great deal more volatility in
the parameter estimates.  While there is some consistency
between the magnitude of the significant demand
elasticities for the linear and the LA/AIDS specifications,
there are not many significant parameter estimates in
Table 4a.  For both the linear demand and price reaction
elasticities, a number of parameter estimates are outside of
the range reported in other studies. For example, estimated
                                               
24. We note, however, that since the demand and reaction
elasticities in the LA/AIDS elasticities are calculated as quantity
elasticities, they are directly comparable across the three
models.Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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price reaction elasticities of 2.1 for private labels in the
pasta and 1.9 for national brands in the yogurt categories
(both significant at a = .01) not only seem high, they are
inconsistent with previous research (e.g., Lambin 1976). 
We conjecture that the relative stability of the parameter
estimates and the high number of significant coefficients in
the LA/AIDS system is due in large part to the highly
flexible form of the LA/AIDS specification.
6. Discussion
6.1 Methodological Issues
Despite some restrictive demand-side assumptions and
a seemingly inflexible functional form, the Choi (1991)
and Raju, et al. (1995a) models did not fare poorly.  We
were able to determine which of the two best fit the data
and derive a number of statistically significant and
reasonable elasticities.  However, the volatility of the
parameter estimates is disconcerting.  The large number of
insignificant coefficients leaves a researcher without
information on key parameter values. Further, price
reaction elasticities over 1.0 seem questionable even if
statistically significant.  In contrast, the LA/AIDS
framework introduced above provides us with a flexible
functional form that performs well on both individual
categories and on a larger pooled sample.  Further, the
structural equation system provides clear and significant
demand and supply-side results.
Perhaps most importantly, the PIGLOG form of the
LA/AIDS model allows estimation at various levels of
aggregation, minimizing the assumptions necessary to
avoid linear aggregation bias.  Christen, Gupta, Porter,
Staelin and Wittink (1997) demonstrate that non-linear
models estimated with linearly aggregated data can
produce biased response parameters.  The intuition behind
this bias is similar to aggregation biases in advertising,
(Leone 1995), diffusion (Putsis 1996) and demand
analysis (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a). However, the
LA/AIDS model has especially nice aggregation
properties. First, it does not necessitate the assumption of
parallel linear Engel curves in order to achieve exact
aggregation (see, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b).
This implies that estimated expenditure relationships are
“representative” and do not contain the same bias as
suggested by Christen, et al. (1997).  Second, it is easy to
demonstrate that any bias in marketing mix response
estimates can be eliminated by taking the first difference,
provided that relative store prices remain the same from
one period to the next.
25
We offer two arguments that suggest that this is a
reasonable assumption. First, retail costs and manufacturer
incentives are likely to vary similarly across stores over
time in a given market, suggesting that retail prices in a
given market should vary approximately by the same
proportions over time.  Second, Christen, et al. (1997)
report that the magnitude of the bias can be severe, with
the average error of over 100 percent for low frequency
promotion items.  Yet, despite this, our parameter
estimates for own-demand response, cross-demand
response and competitive reactions are consistent with a
number of previous studies (see Results section above),
suggesting to us that any aggregation bias, if present at all,
is kept to a minimum.
In summary, we suggest that the level of data
aggregation and concerns about aggregation biases (e.g., in
instances where there is significant variance in pricing and
promotional activity across stores) should play an
important role in deciding whether the level or first
difference form of the LA/AIDS formulation should be
used.  For higher levels of aggregation (both in terms of
multiple categories and the use of market level data), one
should consider using a difference formulation, whereas a
level formulation would be preferred when looking at store
level data for a single category, for example. For any
pooled sample, one should only consider using the first
difference formulation.
Finally, the variation from category to category in each
of the parameter estimates suggests that while a pooled
analysis might provide estimates of the demand and
reaction elasticities that are correct on average, they are
likely to provide inaccurate estimates of the response for
any specific category.  Although a pooled analysis
provides some level of generalizability, the parameter
estimates should be viewed as precisely that—general
                                               
25. This can be shown quite easily. Under a first difference
model, all variables are expressed as the change from period t to
t+1.  Since the marketing mix response in a LA/AIDS
specification of our model is log-log in share, first differencing
expresses prices, for example, as the log of the ratio of prices in t
and t-1.  As long as the relative prices move together, the ratio
of the prices is constant.  Thus, if the percent change in prices is
the same from store to store, the bias is eliminated (this is
analogous to homogeneous marketing mix variables in the
Christen, et. al. 1996 paper).  Thus, it is not necessary that all
consumers at all stores face the same prices.  We would argue
that assuming that the relative prices remain the same from one
period to the next is much more tenable than assuming that all
stores have the same prices.Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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results that may not hold for specific categories.  Detailed
information on the interaction that occurs for any specific
category requires intra-category analysis (Bresnahan
1989).
6.2 Substantive Issues and Managerial Implications.
Once the methodological issues are resolved, there are
a number of important substantive findings (we focus on
the LA/AIDS parameter estimates in Tables 1 through 3
here). For example, retail concentration (measured by the
local retail four-firm concentration ratio, GROCCR4) has
a consistently positive impact on price for both national
brands and private labels (see, e.g., the pooled results in
Table 1).  Thus, a more concentrated local retail
environment results in a higher retail price across the
board and the national brand private label price differential
narrows.  These results are more significant than prior
studies of the retail concentration-price hypothesis (e.g.
Marion 1979, Cotterill 1986) because they are based on a
much larger sample of prices and chain supermarkets.  At
the brand level, we find that categories with many brands
(i.e., a low Herfindahl) have higher national brand and
lower private label prices.  As suggested by Schmalensee
(1978) and Putsis (1997), brand proliferation elevates all
brand prices and makes it more difficult for private labels
to compete.
Price response is decidedly asymmetric and
idiosyncratic to the category. For example, in the bread
category, a 1% increase in private label price elicits only a
.322 percent increase in national brand price, while there is
no evidence of a corresponding private label price
response. Alternatively, a 1% increase in the national
brand price in the instant coffee category elicits a .777
percent private label price response, this time without an
accompanying national brand price response.  In the price
reaction equations, own feature and display have strong
negative estimated coefficients for both private labels and
national brands. It appears as though when price cuts
occur, feature advertising and point of sale displays occur
more frequently, advertising the price cuts. However, when
national brand display and feature ads are active, private
label prices are lower. This suggests to us that retailers
often use price as a strategic weapon in categories where
national brands use non-price promotion extensively.  This
is consistent with recent experience in the breakfast cereal
industry (Gejdenson and Schumer 1999a, 1999b;
Angrisani, 1996; Cotterill 1996).
In investigating some of the differences in price
reactions across categories, we discovered that the price
response is heavily dependent upon the existing private
label share in the category.  To illustrate this, we divided
the sample into quartiles based upon private label share. 
Table 5 presents the estimated demand and price reaction
elasticities across these quartiles. While there is little
change in the own demand response across quartiles, we
note that both the national brand demand response to
private label price and the price reaction elasticities
(national brand response to private label price in
particular) increase substantially across quartiles. It
appears as though price is not an important strategic
weapon when private label share is low, but becomes
increasingly important as private label share increases. 
Part of this, of course, is reflective of the endogeneity of
share and the idiosyncratic nature of the individual
categories.  Nonetheless, this is consistent with previous
work on competition using a conjectural variations
approach (e.g., Gelfand and Spiller 1984), and it highlights
the importance of an intra-industry analysis.
On the demand side (focusing on the results in Table
3), we find that the estimated own price demand elasticities
ranged from -1.05 for instant coffee to -2.42 in the Yogurt
category.  All estimated elasticities are highly significant.
In general, private label demand is more price elastic,
although two exceptions are the bread and milk categories.
Demand side responses to price changes, like supply side
price reactions, are decidedly asymmetric: in general,
private label demand is more responsive to changes in
national brand price than was national brand demand to
private label price. The one exception is in the butter
category, a category where the national brand share is
relatively low (.54).  The expenditure elasticities are above
1.0 in all three models for national brands and below 1.0 in
all three models for private labels.  Household income
elasticities (mean household income in 1992 was $39,358)
in Table 2 indicate that an increase in household income
has a small but significant positive impact on branded
volume and a very but significant negative impact on
private label volume.  This suggests that higher income
implies a lower level of private label consumption, i.e., it is
an inferior good.  The fact that both income elasticities are
less than one implies that food is a necessity and, as
income increases, a smaller portion of the budget is
allocated to it.
7. Conclusions
Analysis of panel data such as the IRI Supermarket
Review data studied here combined with consideration of
both demand and supply side influences provide
considerably more insight into competitive strategies thanMarket Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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do single-equation cross sectional studies. In order to get a
more complete view of the strategic implications and in an
attempt to produce generalizable results, we have
conducted our empirical analysis across a variety of
categories and geographic markets.  We felt it important to
understand “the big picture” first, especially given the
recent focus in marketing on generalizability, and given
this is the first study to address the impact of competitive
response on private label and national brand sales volume.
Based upon the discussion above, certain substantive
implications become clear:
• Brand managers should expect to face traditional
demand relationships regardless of whether they are
managing a national brand or a private label - an increase
in the price of a national brand (private label) lowers
national brand (private label) share.  There are no free
lunches here—a higher price means a lower share, ceteris
paribus.
• Both demand and supply-side reactions will vary by
category, highlighting the importance of understanding the
category-specific nature of competition and demand
response.
• National brand prices are higher in categories with
extensive product proliferation.  Private labels have greater
difficulty competing in these categories, and lower prices
in an attempt to compete.  However, the cross price
elasticities suggest this is a meager way to capture volume
from national brands.
• National brand private label price differential is lower
when local retail concentration is high, suggesting that
local retail concentration can afford retailers some degree
of market power.
• Cross price elasticities are decidedly asymmetric with
national brand price having a major impact on private label
sales, whereas private label price has a considerably
smaller impact on branded sales. This is consistent with
the work on asymmetric competition and price tiers
(Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989; Allenby and Rossi
1991). However, these asymmetries can be reversed,
consistent with recent work by Bronnenberg and Wathieu
(1996).
• Managers responsible for private labels operating in
markets with higher per capita income or categories with a
higher level of expenditure will have a more difficult time
penetrating the market. More generally, we would expect
private labels to suffer during stronger economic times.
Methodologically, the following conclusions are drawn:
• The linear demand specification supports Stackelberg
proportional markup conduct.  It produces demand
estimates that are generally reasonable, but LA/AIDS
demands produce more consistent demand side estimates.
• Estimated price reaction elasticities under the proposed
LA/AIDS framework are not only statistically significant,
but also consistent with previous studies. This is not true
of the Choi (1991) or Raju, et al. (1995a) linear demand
models.
• Within-category analysis should be used wherever
possible—analysis of data pooled across categories is
likely to be correct on average, but can lead to incorrect
conclusions for any specific category.
 Finally, as discussed in the introduction, insights into
the effectiveness of competitive strategies for branded and
private label grocery products entails an understanding of
not only the effectiveness of various strategies on the
demand side, but an understanding of the supply side
competitive interaction between national brands and
private labels as well.  In order to assess the viability of
such strategies, it is important to differentiate between the
direct demand side effect and the likely response of rival
firms. We encourage future research in this area, in
particular, addressing competitive interaction on category-
by-category basis with the use of disaggregate data.
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Chart 1.  Definitions for Variables Used in the Analysis
1
BRSHARE Aggregate share of category expenditure for branded products in the ith market, jth category
PLSHARE Aggregate share of category expenditure for private label products, ith market, jth category
BRPRICE Natural log of the price of the branded product in the ith market, jth category
PLPRICE Natural log of the price of the private label product in the ith market, jth category
EXPENDITURE Natural log of per capita category expenditures deflated by Stone’s price index
BRFEATURE Percent of branded products sold with feature advertising in the ith market, jth category
BRDISPLAY Percent of branded products sold with displays and point-of-sale promotion, ith market, jth category
PLFEATURE Percent of private label products sold with feature advertising in the ith market, jth category
PLDISPLAY Percent of private label products sold with displays and point-of-sale promotion
INCOME Natural log of the average household income in the local market
HISPANIC Percent of population in the local market of Hispanic decent
AGE Natural log of the average age of the local market population
PLDISTN Private label average distribution in the ith market, jth category
BRPRICEREDN Weighted percent average price reduction, branded products, ith market, jth category
PLPRICEREDN Weighted percent average price reduction, private label products, ith market, jth category
BRVOLPUN Natural log of average volume (weight) per package unit sold for branded product
PLVOLPUN Natural log of average volume (weight) per package unit sold for private label
HERFINDAHL Herfindahl index of brand concentration in the ith market, jth category
GROCCR4 Percentage of all grocery sales by the top four grocery chains in the ith market, jth category
1.  Price rather than the natural log of price, and quantity rather than share, are used in the linear category models.
Table 1.  Estimation Results for Pooled Data: LA/AIDS Model (First Difference)
Demand Equations Price Reaction Equations
Branded Share Private Label Share Branded Price Private Label Price
BR Price -0.019 (-4.87)** 0.019 (4.87)** 0.115 (12.64)**
PL Price 0.018 (5.69)** -0.018 (-5.70)** 0.100 (16.99)**
BR Price Reduction -0.104 (-6.29)**
PL Price Reduction -0.213 (-12.18)**
BR Volume/Unit -0.857 (-146.00)**
PL Volume/Unit -0.843 (-106.50)**
BR Herfindahl -0.161 (-8.80)** 0.433 (17.45)**
Grocery CR4 0.042 (3.10)** 0.064 (3.37)**
Expenditure 0.054 (15.54)** -0.054 (-15.54)** 0.219 (35.74)** 0.145 (17.29)**
Br Feature 0.111 (6.35)**    -0.111 (-6.35)** -0.209 (-7.15)** -0.073 (-1.75)
Br Display 0.153 (12.95)** -0.153 (-12.95)** -0.413 (-20.65)** -0.115 (-4.02)**
PL Feature -0.022 (-2.09)* 0.022 (2.09)* 0.011 (0.610) -0.151 (-5.90)**
PL Display -0.085 (-12.13)** 0.085 (12.13)** -0.013 (-1.11) -0.234 (-13.99)**
PL Distribution -0.187 (-36.06)** 0.187 (36.06)** 0.029 (3.23)** 0.027 (2.15)*
Income 0.021 (3.11)** -0.021 (-3.11)** 0.121 (10.46)** -0.065 (-3.94)**
Hispanic -0.001 (-0.017) 0.001 (0.017) -0.479 (-3.86)** -0.210 (-1.18)
Family Age -0.014 (-0.932) 0.014 (0.932) -0.185 (-7.18)** -0.107 (-2.91)**
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
Number of Observations = 6717
(t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelMarket Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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Table 2. Estimated Demand Elasticities for Pooled Data:
                 LA/AIDS Model (First Difference)
Branded Private  Label
Quantity Quantity
BR Price -1.078 0.270
 (-175.78)** (12.75)**




BR Feature 0.009 -0.031
(6.347)** (-6.347)**
BR Display 0.022 -0.076
(12.955)** (-12.96)**
PL Feature -0.002 0.006
(-2.088)* (2.088)*
PL Display -0.013 0.043
(-12.13)** (12.13)**






Family Age -0.0005 0.002
 (-0.932) (0.932)
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
t-statistics in parentheses
** significant at the 1% level.
* significant at the 5% level
Table 3. Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Individual Product Categories, LA/AIDS Model (Level Data)
Milk Butter Bread Yogurt Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
BR Own Price -1.63 -1.82 -1.80 -2.42 -1.48 -1.16 -1.05
Elasticity     (-4.20)**     (-3.19)**      (-9.66)**    (-12.00)**     (-13.90)**    (-21.63)**    (-47.06)**
PL Own Price -1.22 -2.93 -1.66 -4.85 -2.31 -5.86 -0.100
Elasticity     (-2.81)**      (-4.47)**    (-4.66)**    (-5.11)**    (-3.38)**    (-6.60)**  (-0.318)
BR Cross Price 0.458 1.39 0.234 0.795 0.206 0.474 -0.043
Elasticity (0.513)     (2.94)** (1.86)    (4.06)** (1.91)      (5.47)**     (-2.86)**
PL Cross Price 0.308 1.14 2.26 6.87 3.04 1.66 1.05
Elasticity (1.63)  (1.44)    (4.30)**     (7.04)**      (4.50)**    (3.01)**   (2.26)*
BR Price Reaction -0.600 0.401 0.322 0.705 1.25 1.06 0.070
Elasticity (-1.64)      (3.40)**    (3.39)**     (3.99)** (0.932)      (3.69)**  (1.07)
PL Price Reaction 0.175 0.777 0.321 1.02 1.01 0.231 -0.083
Elasticity   (2.10)*     (4.53)** (0.84)    (2.05)*    (2.89)** (0.776)  (-0.518)
Average BR Share .30 .54 .62 .77 .81 .84 .94
NOBS 116 112 118 114 118 118 108
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label (t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelMarket Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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Table 4a. Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Individual Product Categories, Linear Model (Selected Model, Choi or Raju)
Milk Butter Bread Yogurt Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
Selected Demand
Structure Raju Choi Choi Raju Raju Choi Raju
BR Own Price -2.74 -0.453 -0.415 -1.99 -1.12 -1.31 -0.907
Elasticity    (-6.06)**  (-0.676)  (-0.925)      (-7.38)**     (-8.40)**    (-12.95)**     (-18.37)**
PL Own Price -0.831 -0.245 0.060 -3.03 -0.609 -7.78 -0.009
Elasticity  (-1.62)  (-0.245)  (0.084)    (-2.21)* (-1.02)    (-5.34)**  (-0.028)
BR Cross Price -0.059 -0.020 -0.472 0.391 -0.141 0.564 -0.135
Elasticity (-0.057)  (-0.032) (-1.83)  (1.36) (-1.33)    (3.80)**      (-3.91)**
PL Cross Price 0.769 -1.93 -1.73 4.001 0.481 4.18 1.17
Elasticity    (3.40)**  (-1.82)  (-1.38)      (3.10)** (0.641)     (3.95)**      (2.61)**
BR Price Reaction -0.361 0.551 0.307 1.89 1.19 1.44 0.039
Elasticity (-1.42)     (5.16)**   (2.25)*      (2.96)** (0.400)      (4.28)**  (0.603)
PL Price Reaction 0.199 0.731 0.740 -0.076 2.101 0.170 -0.077
Elasticity  (2.39)*     (5.21)**  (2.48)*  (-0.068)     (3.77)**  (0.545)  (-0.484)
Average BR Share .30 .54 .62 .77 .81 .84 .94
NOBS 116 112 118 114 118 118 108
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label (t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% level
Table 4b. Demand Structure, Manufacturer Stackelberg, and Proportional Markup Test Results for Individual
Categories, Linear Model*
Milk Butter Bread Yogurt Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
Demand Structure Raju Choi Choi Raju Raju Choi Raju
   (A9 and A10 in p=.02 p=.11 p=.94 p=.01 p=.00 p=.42 p=.00
     Appendix A)
Manufacturer Stackelberg Conduct?
i) National Brand Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No
     (Equation A11) p=.17 p=.94 p=.35 p=.01 p=.67 p=.00 p=.06
ii) Private Label Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
    (Equation A13) p=.38 p=.80 p=.93 p=.52 p=.02 p=.74 p=.98
Proportional Markup Conduct?
i) National Brand Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
    (Equation A12) p=.51  p=.45 P=.22  p=.00 p=.59 p=.63  p=.00
ii) Private Label Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   (Equation A14) p=.09  p=.67 P=.94  p=.99 p=.73 p=.17  p=.98
* All tests use a 5% significance level criterion (p = test probability values).Market Share and Price Setting Behavior Cotterill, Putsis Jr., Dhar
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Table 5.  Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Subsets Sorted by Private Label Share: LA/AIDS Model (First Difference)
Quartile           Low           Mid Low               Mid High          High
(Private Label Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
Market Share)  (0 – 11.1%)    (11.2 - 23.1%) (23.2 - 39.9%) (> 39.9%)
BR Own Price -1.035 -1.057 -1.131 -1.285
Elasticity    (-201.4)**     (-147.1)**     (-84.99)**     (-38.78)**
PL Own Price -1.011 -0.907 -1.191 -1.413
Elasticity    (-19.84)**    (-22.05)**     (-25.08)**      (-23.77)**
BR Demand Cross 0.0006 -0.013 0.056 0.390
Price Elasticity (0.220)     (-2.26)**     (4.01)**     (6.95)**
PL Demand Cross 0.715 0.399 0.417 0.302
Price Elasticity    (6.89)**     (7.98)**     (9.81)**     (8.59)**
BR Price Reaction 0.075 0.115 0.096 0.360
Elasticity    (8.78)**     (9.19)**     (5.34)**     (11.15)**
PL Price Reaction 0.173 0.110 0.103 0.229
Elasticity    (7.35)**     (7.03)**     (6.08)**     (11.78)**
NOBS 1680 1679 1681 1678
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
(t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.
* significant at the 5% levelFOOD MARKETING POLICY CENTER
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